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Abstract.  Payment for ecosystem services (PES) has been adopted by the Chinese government over the past 
decade as a mechanism to combat regional-scale rangeland degradation. We analyzed some fundamental 
problems associated with PES application in rangeland management from the perspective of social-ecological 
system (SES) resilience by using as a case study he PES project of “retire livestock to restore rangeland” in 
Inner Mongolia. The study findings demonstrated that PES project resulted in obvious negative impacts on 
local pastoralists’ livelihood and society networks without achieving any substantial rangeland restoration. 
Such failures are rooted in that PES strategy in which the logic of using cash to purchase ecological services, 
fragmented and simplified the localized and diverse relationship within the SES thereby weaken its resilience. 
We concluded that PES should be aimed at SES function and improve its resilience during disturbances, and 
not just simply focus on maintaining ecological service. In this sense, we argue for the use of Payment for 
SES Resilience instead of Payment for Ecological Services in the future. 
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Introduction 
Rangeland covers 41.7% of China’s total land area (MOA 
2010), and supports around 17 million pastoralists who 
depend on pastoral and agro-pastoral systems for their live-
lihood (ECOAHYB 2011). In the 1990s, the extent of 
rangeland degradation, caused the Chinese Government to 
gradually shifted rangeland resources policies from sup-
porting animal husbandry to providing ecological services. 
This transition has gained momentum since the beginning 
of 21st century. With overgrazing identified as the prime 
cause of the degradation, the government implemented a 
series of policies and projects to reduce grazing pressure on 
rangeland, including: fencing to both exclude and manage 
grazing; development of intensive animal husbandry to re-
duce reliance on extensive grazing; and displacement of 
pastoralists from highly degraded areas. Since these initia-
tive constrained livestock production which is the primary 
livelihood of local pastoralists, the government employed 
payments to facilitate a smoothe implementation by helping 
pastoralists to maintain their current living conditions. In 
effect, the government was purchasing ecosystem services 
from pastoralists. Wunder (2005) defined PES as a volunta-
ry transaction where a well-defined ecosystem service (ES) 
(or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being 
‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer from a (minimum 
one) ES provider if and only if the ES provider secures ES 
provision (conditionality). Due to the institutional differ-
ences (such as property arrangements and political 
traditions), PES in China may not hold the exact meaning 
of Wunder’s definition, and the Chinese academy and gov-
ernment are trying to establish the pre-conditions for a PES 
mechanism. So, it is essential to understand the issues asso-
ciated with the current PES system for rangeland to provide 
base for future policy development.  
PES is clearly focused on the provision of ecological 
services. Grassland ecosystems have been under human 
management for thousands of years during which local 
people have helped maintain the ecosystem functions to 
varying degrees while utilize the natural resources. This has 
led to a co-evolution of the social system and the ecosystem 
into a coupled social-ecological system (SES). A SES can-
not be managed by focusing only either the social or 
ecological systems because ecological and social processes 
and their relationship are non-linear. Thus system dynamics 
are uncertain, interruptions and accidents are inevitable, the 
goal of conservation should be to maintain the capacity of a 
system to experience shocks while retaining essentially the 
same function, structure, feedbacks, and therefore identity, 
which is to maintain the resilience of SES (Walker et al. 
2006). Here, we emphasized the significance of diverse and 
localized interactions between the different components of 
SES in maintaining its resilience (Folke 2006), because it is 
the interactions and feedbacks between different compo-
nents, which are part of the SES functions, that make SES 
work as a whole.  
Based on case studies drawn from the “retire livestock 
to restore rangeland” (RLTRR) project, the longest running 
PES project in China’s rangeland area, this article analyzed 
the effects of PES project in the rangeland of China from 
the perspective of resilience thinking, particularly the prob-
lems payments have caused to the resilience of rangeland 
SES.  
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Methodology 
We conducted field surveys to gather information about the 
impacts of RLTRR project implemented on the pastoral 
area of in Inner Mongolia which is one of the biggest pas-
toral areas in China. We undertook surveys in Sonid Left 
Banner (SLB) and Alxa Left Banner (ALB) because in In-
ner Mongolia the RLTRR project was implemented quite 
differently from areas to areas.  
SLB is located in a desert steppe in the middle of Inner 
Mongolia where mean annual rainfall is 165 to 215 mm. 
We did a case study in B Village which implemented a 
“grazing-rest” project during 2003 to 2007. Grazing was 
prohibited in certain period in springs (from April 1st to 
May 30th in 2003 and 2004, April 15th to May 30th in 2005 
to 2007) when new growth of C3 grasses is highly sensitive 
to grazing. Pastoralists received compensation of RMB 
9.15/ha of rangeland each year or the equivalent value in 
corn. As cultivation or hay-cutting are not feasible in this 
environment, pastoralists had to buy forage during the graz-
ing-rest periods. In July 2007 we selected 28 households 
through stratified random sampling based on wealth level 
and spatial distribution and conducted in-depth interview 
with them. 
ALB is located in a desert region in western Inner 
Mongolia where annual rainfall ranges from 64 to 208 mm. 
It is sparsely populated. Residents in the northern area were 
Mongolians who livelihood is linked to grazing goats and 
camels. Han people dominate the southern region where 
they are engaged in cultivation or a mixed crop-livestock 
production system. The “Grazing-ban” policy was imple-
mented in many areas throughout the banner. The 
Government paid subsidies to pastoralists and encouraged 
them to move to towns for alternative livelihoods. From 
June to July of 2009, we conducted household interview 
with 33 pastoral households randomly selected from 15 
villages in the north. An in-depth survey was conducted 
with 30 randomly selected households in a displacement 
site (C Village) for former pastoralist participated in graz-
ing ban project near the capital of ALB. In August 2010, 
we conducted a follow-up interview with 9 households in C 
village.  
Results of implementing PES projects 
Influences of PES on pastoral social systems 
Rearing livestock in pens during grazing rest time also 
increased labor inputs to find feed supplied and provide 
watering for livestock. One pastoralist from SLB described 
the burdensome tasks: “Rearing in pens is very demanding. 
It requires at least three workers to take care of the lives-
tock. In the morning, we feed each sheep a half kilogram of 
silage in a trough; in the noon, we feed each sheep 0.2 kilo-
grams of corn; in the evening, we feed each sheep a half 
kilogram of hay, directly on the ground. We need to sepa-
rate goats with sheep and separate adults with lambs. 
Sometimes the work is so occupying that we don’t even 
have time to eat.” Before the grazing rest policy was en-
forced, all the pastoralists need to do was to herd the 
livestock to the rangeland where they would graze all by 
themselves, so much less labor was required. 
Without a good knowledge of animal husbandry, pen-
raising may resulted in a loss of livestock condition. During 
the long and freeze winter livestock loose weight and by 
spring are in great need of fresh nutritious grasses to restore 
their body condition, especially if they are pregnant. Under 
the grazing rest policy, however, the livestock were prohi-
bited to graze in the open rangeland during the critical time 
for their recover. Thus, livestock suffered a protracted pe-
riod of low maintenance feed supply which affects their 
productivity. When the grazing rest period ends, livestock 
often over-eat which also causes health complications. 
Such complex interactions between livestock and vegeta-
tions were obviously not expected when the policy was 
designed.  
Under the grazing ban policy and ecological displace-
ment project, the livelihood of pastoralists was seriously 
challenged. C village is the newest displacement site with 
the biggest investment in funding and infrastructure since 
grazing ban projects were implemented in this Banner. 
During 2007 and 2008, this village had to accommodate 
~300 pastoral households who participated in grazing ban 
project and subsequently gave up grazing. The government 
provided each household with a house, greenhouse to plant 
vegetable and a sheepfold for free. Pastoralists 50 (female) 
or 55 (male) received an additional RMB570/month from 
the government as an annuity. The government plan was 
based on the assumption that the migrants would engage in 
greenhouse plantation as an alternative livelihood. Howev-
er, it is well known that pastoralists have poor agronomic 
skills and would be unlikely generate a living by cultivating 
vegetables. While more than 200 household were initially 
engaged in greenhouse cultivation in 2007 to 2008, less 
than 20 households were still pursuing this as their livelih-
ood in 2009. Of the 22 households from C Village 
interviewed in 2009, only six were still engaged in green-
house agriculture, five had returned to animal husbandry 
eight lived on casual jobs (manual labor such as drivers and 
construction workers) and three had no jobs and lived sole-
ly on annuities. As is a common practice the elderly and 
children lived in C Village while the young people returned 
to herd animals in the pastoral areas. 
Influences of PES on pastoralists’ livelihood 
Grazing rest and grazing ban with displacement resulted in 
quite different impacts on pastoralists’ livelihood. Under 
grazing rest project, the main impacts are related to the cost 
and benefits of pastoralism. Grazing rest significantly in-
creased forage costs since the average level of government 
compensation cover less than 14% of the additional feed 
costs. Based on prices in 2006, it cost RMB1.6/day to feed 
a sheep in B Village which meant that government com-
pensation only could sustain for a sheep for 23 days, only 
half the 45 days mandated in B village policy. More impor-
tant is tht statistic that 19 of the 27 households surveyed 
received less compensation than the average level. 
PES projects have severely eroded the social relationships 
in pastoral regions causing conflicts among community 
members. In B Village, for example, a pastoralist (A) 
rented a pasture from a poorer fellow (B) in the same     
Village. The compensation for grazing rest was assigned to 
B, which was unfair since it was A who suffered the cost 
Influences of PES on the pastoral social relationship 
Li Wenjun et al. 
© 2013 Proceedings of the 22nd International Grassland Congress 1788 
from grazing rest. For communally grazed rangeland vil-
lagers suspected that village leaders embezzled the 
compensation paid. Since the compensation for grazing rest 
could not cover the costs incurred, pastoralists resorted to 
illegal herding by tending their animals in pens during the 
day time but herded them on rangelands at night to avoid 
government monitoring and penalties. Sometimes, pastoral-
ists were caught. However, the rich, village leaders and 
relatives of government monitoring agencies staff could 
usually avoid the penalty, either through personal relations, 
social influences or bribes. In contrast, the most margina-
lized poor people could avoid the penalty as they do not 
have such relationships. As one of the pastoralists of ALB 
said, “I don’t think the rangeland changed much since the 
implementation of grazing ban policy. Those powerful guys 
are still herding their livestock on the rangeland. I herded 
secretly twice, and got caught both times. I paid several 
hundred yuan in penalties simply because I don’t have any 
influential relations.” Consequently the existing inequality 
in the community was intensified, arousing jealousy, hatred 
and a sense of injustice, corroding trust and cooperation in 
the community. This situation also made pastoralist lose 
trust in the government.  
Influences of PES on ecosystems 
The final goal of PES project is to restore the ecosystem 
services of rangeland ecosystem. However, the ecological 
outcomes of RLTRR project in Inner Mongolia are ques-
tionable. For example, grazing ban and grazing rest policy 
had be implemented in 33.2% of its usable rangeland in 
2003 (EPDOIM 2004), and in 67% of usable rangeland in 
2009 (CCCOIM 2010), yet the deteriorating trend of ran-
geland was still not under control (GOIM, 2010), possibly 
because there are multiple causes contributing to rangeland 
degradation.  
There is a sting belief among pastoralists that the de-
cline in rangeland productivity is caused by droughts. 
Among 28 of interviewees in B Village, 12 believed that 
grazing rest is irrelevant to restoring the ecosystem. They 
believed that sufficient forage can grow with enough rain, 
no matter if grazing is banned or not, and vice versa. Five 
of them thought that improvement gained grazing rest 
simply depended on rainfall, with abundant rain being the 
pre-condition for grazing rest to be effective. Only two in-
terviewees could see some merit in grazing rest because the 
increase in production cost forced pastoralist to reduce li-
vestock number. With an overwhelming majority believing 
that grazing ban and grazing rest had limited effects rangel-
and improvement, most herders simply consider such a 
policy to be ridiculous.  
Interviews with pastoralists revealed that the interac-
tion between grazing and vegetation is a non-linear and the 
degradation process complex. According to the pastoralists, 
if grazing is excluded for a long period (e.g. 5 years), ran-
geland condition could become worse through the ingress 
of weedy species. A pastoralist in ALB explained, “Several 
years ago, grazing ban was enforced on a piece of my 
mother’s rangeland. Now, the grasses died out, the leaves 
and stalks near the ground were rotted, because there were 
no animals to graze the grasses for years.” The pastoralist 
himself stopped grazing from 2006 and just one year later 
grasses on his rangeland started to die. Some herding ex-
perts in Alxa also showed us the same situation. In SLB, an 
experienced old herdsman also mentioned that “The grasses 
can’t grow well if the rangeland is not utilized for years. 
Achnatherum sptendens would turn blue and die if it is not 
grazed for one or two years. Where rangeland is not grazed 
for one year, the grasses would cover the ground during the 
winter. In the next spring the grasses grow very slowly as 
the dry leaves prevented the new tissues to regenerate”. It 
can be seen that the relationship between vegetation and 
livestock is very complex. Banning grazing cannot neces-
sarily protect the rangeland since it has changed the 
ecological dynamics of the rangeland.  
Pastoralists used to be an active force in protecting 
rangelands through preventing damaging explorations from 
outsiders. The grazing ban policy, however, excluded pas-
toralists’ role in conservation as it encouraged pastoralists 
to move away from rangeland. As a pastoralist in Alxa re-
ported, “since the grazing ban policy was implemented, 
pastoralists were moved out and mining has become more 
and more severe. Eleven mining sites were built in last win-
ter and spring in my village, many of which are fluorite 
mines. Before implementation of grazing ban, if anyone 
wanted to open up a mine on rangeland, he must negotiate 
with the pastoralists who have the user right of that rangel-
and. Now, they don’t need to.” Other interviewees in ALB 
reported that “the rangeland was destroyed by people from 
neighboring provinces who came to dig Cistanche deserti-
cola and scorpion for medicine market. Those guys came in 
flocks. They dig the rangeland with shoves and even explo-
sive, leaving the rangeland with pits everywhere. In this 
case, how could the rangeland be protected?”  
Discussion and Conclusion  
Based on previous results, we state that the PES project in 
Inner Mongolian rangeland did not reach its expectations of 
restoring the rangeland without harming the livelihood of 
pastoralists. A fundamental reason for such situation is that 
PES project had neglected the complex nature and the enti-
rety of social-ecological system by cutting off and 
simplifying the relations among the components of the sys-
tem and thus impairing the system’s resilience.  
Rangeland and livestock are coupled and mutually-
dependent. The efforts to remove grazing from rangeland in 
the PES project, irrespective of whether it was for months 
or for years, distorted the ecological feedbacks, thus re-
sulted in unexpected outputs, such as the death of grasses 
after long-term grazing ban and the abnormality of lives-
tock due to delayed access to fresh grasses and over feeding 
when graze rest ended. With an over emphasis on ecologi-
cal output, the sustainable livelihood of local people and 
their dependence on local social networks and ecosystem 
were ignored. Consequently, ill-designed PES project with 
a “one glove fits all” approach decreased the livelihood of 
local people, caused conflicts and hostility between com-
munity members, distrust of government programs, and 
maladjustment to change of life style and culture. During 
this process, localized social networks were eroded, vertical 
connections between government and individuals which 
displaced former diversified horizontal connections among 
local people has become dominant in social interactions.  
Ecosystem services in rangeland conservation 
© 2013 Proceedings of the 22nd International Grassland Congress 1789 
Ecological knowledge and their utilization, i.e. the un-
derstanding and management of ecosystem, is the key 
coordinating the feedbacks between ecosystem and social 
system. Based on long term experiences of herding and 
cultural heritages, local people may contribute knowledge 
of ecosystem dynamics from a perspective different from 
modern science. For example, they appreciated the effects 
of rainfall on rangeland conditions, which had been sup-
ported by New Rangeland Ecology (Ellis and Swift 1988, 
Westoby et al. 1989). They could also play an active role in 
supervising and combating ecosystem-damaging activities 
through community participation programs. However, in 
current PES project, policy makers treated the pastoralist 
and the grassland ecosystem at opposite sides, the ecologi-
cal knowledge of pastoralists and their role in rangeland 
management were ignored.  
Its became clear now that in the PES project in Inner 
Mongolia, the natural feedbacks between rangeland and 
livestock were cut off; diversified horizontal connections 
among local pastoralists were eroded and were displaced by 
vertical connections between government and individuals; 
diverse local knowledge was replaced by standard modern 
science and the main role of pastoralists in rangeland man-
agement was replaced by the government. All these 
changes have impaired the mutual feedbacks between so-
cial and ecological systems and reduced the diversity of 
such feedbacks, and thus weakened the resilience of social-
ecological system.  
The realization of the complexity among rangeland 
SES reminds us with the necessity of a shift in payment 
objectives from ecological services onto the resilience of 
SES. The involvement of payment is necessary, but it 
should be aimed to improve the resilience of SES in the 
long term rather than the short-term utilitarian goals. Pay-
ment should be coordinated with the actual production 
needs of the pastoralists and the characteristic of ecosys-
tem, and should protect and promote the potential 
capabilities of the pastoralists in rangeland management. 
Cooperation among multiple actors, including government, 
individuals and organizations, are necessary. We argue that  
scholars should use Payment for SES Resilience instead of 
Payment for Ecological Services, and gradually influence 
decision makers and media in the future. 
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